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When R. M. Sartono died in October, 1968, his public political 
career had already ended. In the aftermath of the coup of 1965, 
he was instrumental in bringing General Suharto and the PNI 
leaders together in an effort to "unify" the party and to give it 
a more significant role in the new government. This effort 
ultimately failed and, in a sense, was merely the last of many 
failures, no fault of his own, in SartonoTs long political life.
Before the war, Sartono presided over the disbanding of 
Sukarnofs PNI and then of Partindo. After the transfer of 
sovereignty in 1949, he regarded as the most important and 
fruitful years of his public life those which he spent as Speaker 
of Parliament. But, in 1960, Parliament, too, was suspended. He 
was deeply embittered by this, and stayed out of the government 
for a few years, until he was finally prevailed upon to assume 
the Vice-Chairmanship of the Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (Supreme 
Advisory Council).
Sartonofs experience in the DPA was a great disappointment 
to him. Why he agreed to accept the position is not completely 
clear to me, but some of the reasons which have been advanced may 
help to explain the sort of man he was. It may have been partly, 
as certain critics have suggested, that the old prijaji could not 
really stay away from important office for long. But I think there 
was probably more to it than that. For one thing, Soekarno had 
urged him to do it; and despite their personal and ideological 
disagreements, Sartono still felt considerable loyalty to the man. 
PNI leaders also urged him to accept, no doubt in the hope that 
his old friendship with Soekarno would work wonders for the 
party cause. Whether or not Sartono believed that the other 
party leaders were right in this tactic, he remained loyal to 
the party. He probably also felt that he might be able to do 
something for Indonesia in the DPA, that his services might be 
useful and should be rendered. What he may not have fully under­
stood, however, was that parliamentary politics had really gone 
by the board. His commitment would not let him believe that, 
and the result was that the operations of the DPA in the last 
two or three years before the coup confused and irritated him.
His commitment was to the parliamentary system. A cynical 
view might have it that this was because the old Parliament was 
"his" institution. In the context of post-war politics in 
Indonesia, such an interpretation has some appeal. But with 
Sartono, as with few others, a great deal more was involved. He 
deeply believed, and often said, that organization was the key 
to politics and to the state, and that in Indonesia the development
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of effective negotiating and bargaining institutions was imper­
ative if the state was to remain whole and relatively peaceful.
He took the function of control seriously and, in the early 
1960Ts, often dismissed out of hand, and with some irony, all 
the glib talk about nsocial control.”
In the same way, Sartono took financial responsibility 
very seriously, and was frequently infuriated by lax budgetary 
procedures in the government. Time and again, he proposed, 
without success, a more up-to-date and effective public financial 
accountability act, not only in Parliament, but later in the DPA, 
much to the distress of several Cabinet ministers. When Parlia­
ment was suspended in 1960, it was--in the tradition of parlia­
ments— over a budgetary issue, in which Sartono strongly rejected 
Cabinet interference in the work of a parliamentary committee. 
When the old Parliament was replaced by the DPR-GR, Sartono 
refused to have anything to do with it. In fact, he refused 
every other position offered to him at the time, though at one 
point, it is said, he led Subandrio to believe that he would 
accept an ambassadorship somewhere in Africa, on condition that 
Subandrio himself and Muhammad Yamin, whom Sartono had disliked 
since Gerindo days, also become ambassadors to small African 
states. During his weeks of anger after the suspension of 
Parliament, Sartono once told me that he might accept a position 
on the Supreme Court, if it could be made into an institution 
capable of exercising some control. But he did not, apparently, 
try to get the appointment.
Sartono came from the Mangkunegaran and had the self-con­
fidence of the high-born prijaji, as well as the commitment to 
rationality of the professional advocate. He was basically an 
t!administrator” type of politician. He consciously waved a few 
symbols when he thought it necessary, particularly in speeches 
to party members, but he never seemed very comfortable doing so 
and was not always very good at it. Almost from the beginning 
of his involvement with the PNI, he was reluctant to participate 
in the messier bickerings within the party. He may have felt it 
beneath him. In later years, sesepuh (elder statesman) was the 
most comfortable position for him, and he worked best from it. 
During the last decade of his life, he sometimes spoke with the 
gesticulations of a Semar, though he was too handsome a man to 
play the part fully.
Sartonofs honesty was, I think, unquestionable, and this 
too may have been, at least in part, due to his sense of class 
and his sense of political responsibility. Corruption was 
simply too degrading, though he understood it in others. He 
seldom spoke abstractly about it. Sartono rather prided himself 
on paying all his taxes regularly, and the house in which he 
lived was comfortable and in good taste, but not particularly 
well-furnished.
Sartono was respected by most groups within his party and 
within the government, but his advice was not always heeded. He
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preferred to leave the wielding of power within the party to 
others, and his influence was thereby severely limited. For 
years, he insisted that the PNI must rejuvenate itself by 
bringing in younger people and pushing them quickly to the top, 
but, of course, the counter-pressures were much too strong. He 
knew this, and it angered him, in the same way that he knew that 
regional PNI leaders were basically opposed to land-reform, and 
was angered by that.
SartonoTs Tfradicalismn had integrity, though he usually 
expressed it softly, except to some of the lower ranking party 
members. Even then he refused to go to rhetorical extremes.
He was capable of deep anger against the international and 
domestic economic inequities that he believed to be fundamental 
to IndonesiaTs condition. He was also, as diplomats often dis­
covered, quick to defend Indonesia1s rights and dignity. 
Interestingly enough, Claro Recto was among the few foreign 
politicians of whom I heard Sartono speak highly.
Sartono may have been a man for other, less wild, times, 
but he never lost his self-respect, I think, nor his dignity.
